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Summary
According to the Gothenburg protocol, Norway is committed to reduce its emissions
of NOx to a level 30% below the emissions in the base year 1990, by the end of 2010.
Both Norwegian and foreign governments have made use of voluntary agreements
with industries as a supplement or alternative to more traditional policy instru-
ments. This thesis evaluates the Norwegian NOx-fund, as an alternative method to
reduce NOx emissions compared to a standard tax system.
I start with a theoretical analysis using a standard tax model and compare it
to a fund using an investment based funding system. If the tax is the same in the
two cases, the investment in abatement technology would be greater in the fund
system because of the subsidy for capital expenditures given to the firm. However,
the two taxes are not equal, and the same optimal solution could be reached in the
two cases. As we know that the subsidy given to the firms varies a lot, this suggests
that a fund system will not provide equal marginal abatement costs between firms,
and abatement will not be cost efficiently distributed.
Later on, I expand on the theoretical model and introduce hidden information
about the firms marginal abatement cost. The main result in this model is that a
first best optimum is impossible to reach when the firms have information power over
the fund, and information rent has to be paid to the most efficient firm. Therefore
a lower level of abatement is reached at a higher cost in the second best solution.
I analyze the fund by looking at the marginal abatement cost curve using data
from both implemented and planned abatement projects. There are several types
of new investments in NOx reducing technology, which I classify into seven different
categories. Here I find that the marginal cost of the projects differs a lot between
different initiatives, and also within each category. I see that the most cost efficient
initiatives which also contribute to high abatement levels are fuel saving, selective
catalytic reduction (SCR) and motor technical rebuilding, and I focus my analysis
on these categories of NOx reducing technologies. We see that the most efficient
initiatives also are among the majority of the funded projects from the NOx-fund.
There could also be political explanations for not reaching the first best level of
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abatement. As lobbying from interest groups might affect the government’s prefer-
ences in maximizing welfare, this could lead to environmental policy not maximizing
the NOx reduction at the lowest possible costs.
Finally, I present a few different scenarios scenarios for implementation strate-
gies of NOx reduction technologies. I have looked at the three most cost efficient
categories, and I assume it is possible to double the number of potential projects
if one has a longer time perspective. This implies installing these NOx reducing
technologies into 40% of the Norwegian trade fleet. I find that it would have been
possible to reach the same level of abatement as what is reached today, at a total
cost 39% lower than the present cost level, if twice as many of the SCR, motor
technical rebuilding and change to gas projects were added to the already existing
projects. Instead of reaching the level of 26 078 tons of NOx abatement at a total
cost of 399 million NOK, it could have been reached at a total cost of 244 million
NOK. In a more modest scenario, I find that the same level of abatement could
be reached at a total cost of 321 million NOK, 20% cheaper than today. This is
the case if only the same three projects were carried out. As new investments only
are profitable when they are in dock for other maintenance purposes, this might
suggest that one needs more time in order to reach a more cost efficient solution.
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1 Introduction
According to the Gothenburg protocol, Norway is committed to reduce its emissions
of NOx to a level 30% below the emissions in the base year 1990, by the end
of 2010. Both Norwegian and foreign governments have made use of voluntary
agreements with industries as a supplement or alternative to more traditional policy
instruments, like an emission tax. One example is the Swedish refunded emissions
payment program.1 In this thesis I will analyze these voluntary agreements, using
the Norwegian NOx-fund as an example.
The Gothenburg Protocol was ratified in 1999 and entered into force 17th of
May 2005 (MOE, 2005). The Protocol states that the emissions by the end of 2010
cannot be higher than 156 000 tons of NOx, and should stay at this level from
then on. In the base year 1990 the emissions were 191 000 tons NOx (SSB, 2008).
In order to fulfill these commitments a tax of 17 NOK per kg NOx emission was
introduced 1st of January 2007. As a reaction to the introduction of this pollution
tax, a NOx fund was established. The over 640 firms that have joined the fund are
exempted from paying the tax on NOx emissions to the government. Instead they
have to pay a lower fee per kilo NOx emission to the NOx-fund. The fund finances
emission reducing investments in the firms after applications from the members
of the fund. Slightly more than 200 firms have been promised support from the
Norwegian NOx-fund, for around 520 NOx reducing investment projects.2 Total
expected emission reductions are nearly 27 000 tons of NOx, which includes both
verified and planned projects.
As far as I know, no research has been done until now to try to evaluate the
Norwegian NOx-Fund, but theoretical studies of this type of policy design more
generally is a large field in the literature (Lyon and Maxwell (2000), Hansen (1999),
Arora and Cason (1996) and Khanna (2001)). Sterner and Turnheim (2009) is a
study of the situation in Sweden, but the article is more of a study of the pro-
cess of the technical change and a study of innovation, adoption and diffusion of
1For more examples see chapter 2 about voluntary agreements.
2Updated lists over promised support shows that there are 533 projects in total.
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technology.3
The rest of chapter 1 gives information on what NOx is and its implications for
the environment, the background of the fund and a tax on NOx, and the work of
establishing the NOx-fund. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the existing literature
on voluntary agreements. In chapter 3 I put up a theoretical model comparing a
standard tax system to the Norwegian NOx-fund, and describe the pro’s, con’s and
the respective incentives of the systems. Chapter 4 is a short discussion of the
political economy and its implications of the NOx-fund. In chapter 5 I use data
from the NOx fund, for both implemented and planned initiatives, and compute
their marginal abatement cost functions. In chapter 6 I expand on the theoretical
model from chapter 3, and introduce hidden information about the firms marginal
abatement cost. Chapter 7 concludes.
1.1 Background
Acid rain is caused by combustion of fossil fuels. It originates from the emissions of
a variety of pollutants, that are subsequently chemically converted into acid form,
particularly sulphuric and nitric acids (SO2 and NOx). Its international dimen-
sions arises from the property that some proportion of the pollutant emissions in
question, the precursors of acid rain, are transported over national boundaries by
natural processes, like wind, rain and rivers. Examples include oxides of nitrogen
and sulphur, which can be moved over distances of several hundred miles. Un-
like greenhouse gases, these substances are not uniformly mixed, so the impact is
regionally rather than global (Perman and M.Common, 2003).
About 90 per cent of the sulfur and 80 per cent of the nitrogen deposited in Nor-
way originates in other European countries. This means that the amount of acid
rain falling on Norway is to a large extent determined by developments elsewhere in
Europe(SOE, 2011), with the UK, Germany and Poland among the largest sources.
Studies of consequences of acid rain pollution in Europe have been conducted by
the Commission of the European Communities (CEC, 1983) and the World Conser-
vation Union (WCU, 1990). These research programs have identified the following
3More on Sterner’s article in chapter 2.
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consequences (Perman and M.Common, 2003):
• Increased acidity of lakes, results in dead fish
• Increased acidity of soils, which reduces the number of plants that may grow
• Forest destruction
• Human health effects via acidification of domestic water supplies and sulphate
pollution in general
• Building and infrastructure erosion
• Loss of visibility, causes by fine sulphate particles produced by airborne sulphuric
acid
Graph 1.1: NOx-emissions from Norway 1973-2009. Emissions are measured in
1000 tons. Source: Statistics Norway
Since acid rain does not respect national borders and is a problem for most Euro-
pean countries, international agreements are essential to reduce emissions, and most
agree that this problem has to be solved internationally. The issue of transboundary
pollution is the need to coordinate the environmental policies of national govern-
ments, who might ignore the damage to other countries by caused by domestically
generated pollution (Ulph, 1998). The answer has been to reduce overall European
emissions of sulfur and nitrogen through binding international agreements. Most
European countries have agreed to reduce their emissions of acidifying substances
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through the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution.4 Several bind-
ing protocols have been adopted under the convention, including the Gothenburg
Protocol, which entered into force in 2005. This protocol is being used to control
emissions of sulphur and nitrogen (among others) in Europe from 2010(SOE, 2011).
1.2 Storyline
As previously mentioned the Gothenburg protocol was signed on the 17th of May
2005. Already on the 23rd of May the Ministry of the Environment asked The
Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (Statens Forurensningstilsyn, SFT) to put
down a working group together with the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and
Norwegian Maritime Directorate, to evaluate initiatives contributing to Norwegian
reductions of NOx, in order to fulfill the Gothenburg protocol within 2010.
SFT was asked to look at different ways of reducing the NOx emissions so that
Norway could reach their emission reductions according to the Gothenburg proto-
col.5 Their estimates varied hugely from sector to sector, from 7 to 700 NOK/kg
NOx reduction. The protocol committed Norway to reduce its emissions to a level
of 156 000 tons per year, which at the time meant reducing the emissions yearly
with around 45 000 tons below the emission prognosis for 2010 (SFT, 2006). At
a later stage the emission factors were adjusted down, so that instead of reducing
emissions with 45 000 tons, it meant reducing emissions with 16 000 tons(Flugsrud
and Aasestad, 2010). The object of the analysis was to provide information so
that the best decisions according to abatement costs and reduction potential were
made. They looked at the different initiatives within shipping and fishing, energy
installations offshore and the mainland industry.
For the oil and gas industry the analysis from SFT showed large differences in
abatement costs between different installations. They only looked at installations
of low-NOx turbines called dry low emissions (DLE), as this is the only technology
that is qualified offshore. The investment costs lies between 50 and 600 million NOK
4A convention under the United Nation Economic Commission for Europe, that has been
extended by eight environmental protocols where the most recent one is the Gothenburg Protocol.
5SFT is now renamed KLIF(Climate and Pollution Agency), but as they were called SFT at
the time of this report I will call them SFT in my thesis.
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per turbine. 8 of the total judged 49 machines had a cost less than 50 NOK/kg NOx
reduction, and reduced emissions with 2500 tons NOx. For a cost lower than 100
NOK/kg NOx it could be possible to reduce emissions with 70 000 tons to a cost of
around 3,5 billion NOK. By installing DLE at all 49 machines it would technically
be possible to reduce emissions with 17 000 tons, to a cost of 19 billion NOK.
The costs of each initiative offshore varied between 13 NOK/kg NOx reduction and
700NOK/kg NOx reduction, which is a large variation within one initiative.
For domestic shipping the total NOx reduction potential was in the basis of ships
with engines build after 1990, with a size larger than 100 brutto tonnage. The total
emissions from these ships were in 2005 about 62 000 tons. In reality there are
two possible initiatives possible to implement on board of excising ships, selective
catalytic reduction (SCR) and motor technical rebuilding (MTR).6 If SCR is carried
out on all of the domestic fleet, the emission reductions could be almost 43 000 tons
NOx, to a average cost of 7,46 NOK/kg NOx and a total cost of 320 million NOK.
Thus, by only implementing SCR initiatives one could reach the target and fulfill
the Gothenburg protocol. Alternatively, if MTR was carried out on all ships, it
would have reduced emissions with 10 000 tons to a cost of 50 million NOK, which
gives an average cost of 4,8 NOK/kg NOx. It is not possible to implement both
initiatives at the same ship, so they must be seen as two alternatives.
After a more specific evaluation of the ships, SFT evaluated the possible dis-
tribution of projects between SCR and MTR, so that total possible reductions for
domestic shipping is 26 000 tons NOx.
Emission reduction for each sector of the mainland industry is very uncertain,
and is restricted to a reduction of 5 500 tons to an average cost of 15 NOK/kg NOx
(SFT, 2006). Table 1.1 show the results of the estimated costs and their potential
emission reductions; graph 1.1 and 1.2 represents it graphically.
As a reaction to this report, the Norwegian State introduced a tax from January
1st 2007 of 17 NOK/kg emission of NOx on the following sources:
• propulsion machinery with a total installed capacity of over 750 kW
• motors, boilers and turbines with a total installed capacity of more than 10 MW
6An explanation of the different initiatives can be found in chapter 4.2
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Table 1.1: SFT table. Average costs of abatement and corresponding NOx emission
reduction, measured in tons.
Sector Cost Emission reduc-
tion
Aggregate emission
reduction
Shipping/fishing ships <15 NOK/kg 26 000 26 000
Mainland industry <15 NOK/kg 2 500 28 500
Energy installation <17 NOK/kg 1000 29 500
New ships 20 NOK/kg 10 000 39 500
Mainland industry < 25 NOK/kg 3000 42 500
Energy installation 18-56 NOK/kg 3100 45 600
Energy installation 57-150 NOK/kg 7200 53 800
Graph 1.2: SFT analysis: Aggregated emission reductions measured in tons of NOx
on the x-axis, increasing marginal cost measured in NOK/kg NOx reduction on the
y-axis. Source: SFT
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• flares on offshore installations and facilities on land
By this the tax on emissions covered domestic shipping and fisheries, aviation,
railway operations, landbased activities and offshore activities on the Norwegian
continental shelf (MOF, 2006).
This excise tax was introduced in order to fulfill the Gothenburg agreement
by 2010, and stated that according to previous analyses (from SFT) this could
lead to emission reductions up to 26 000 tons of NOx. Thus, according to the
new calculations of the emission factors performed by Statistics Norway, a tax of 15
NOK/kg NOx emission would have been sufficient in order to reach the target of the
Gothenburg protocol. The government also stated that the SFT report indicated
that initiatives with a marginal cost up to 50-60 NOK/kg NOx had to be carried out
in order for the protocol to be fulfilled, because at that time fulfilling the agreement
meant reducing the NOx emissions with 45 000 tons. These are important findings
of the analysis, as one of the reasons for establishing a fund was not having to face
a marginal cost of 50-60 NOK/kg NOx reduction. These initiatives would not have
been followed through with an emission tax of 17 NOK/kg NOx emission. If one
would have continued with a tax of 17 NOK/kg NOx emission, the new calculations
that downscaled the needed emission reduction to fulfill the agreement, would have
been sufficient in order to reach the goal by using the tax as policy instrument.
To compensate for the high marginal cost they introduced a NOx-RED agree-
ment at the same time, so that shipping could be compensated with up to 30-40
% of their additional cost, and fishing could be compensated with up to 100% of
their additional costs.7 The purpose was to reduce the economic burden for the
internationally exposed industry (MOF, 2006).
In 2007 the total tax revenue was 632 million NOK. The resolution also included
an exemption from the tax if an environmental agreement with the state was agreed
upon concerning the implementation of measures to reduce NOx, in accordance with
a predetermined environmental target. It also stated that ”The Ministry may issue
regulations limiting and imposing conditions on exceptions”.
7The NOx-RED agreement gave the possibility of giving investment support to initiatives that
reduced their emissions in the shipping and fishing industry.
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In 2008 the ”NOx Agreement” and the ”Participation Agreement” were signed.
The NOx agreement is the agreement of establishing the fund, and is a collective
environmental agreement between fourteen business organizations who represented
undertakings emitting NOx, and the Ministry of Environment on behalf of the
Norwegian Government.8 The objective of the agreement was to fulfill specific
reduction obligations in 2008, 2009 and 2010, and the fourteen organizations com-
mitted themselves to ensure the implementation of measures that would reduce
the annual emissions of NOx by 30 000 tons by the end of 2011. These fourteen
business organizations are not themselves producing NOx nor subject to the NOx
tax, so the ”Participation Agreement” created the rights and obligations between
the individual undertakings and the NOx Fund. According to this agreement, the
undertakings that have signed the agreement pay 11 NOK/kg NOx emission to the
firm if they are offshore petroleum industry, and 4 NOK/kg if they are from other
sectors such as shipping, supply vessels, fishing and aviation, instead of paying 17
NOK/kg NOx emission in form of the tax to the government. These fees are set
by the fund itself, not the government. According to the agreement the NOx Fund
shall be operated in accordance with the non-profit principle and has the purpose of
supporting the business organizations in fulfilling their obligations under the agree-
ment, and stated that the state and the Business Organizations are committed to
working together to survey, develop and provide information on possible emission
reducing measures for the implementation of the NOx Agreement. The agreement
also stipulated that the annual reductions in emissions are as follows:
• reduce annual NOx reductions by 2000 tons with measures implemented in 2008
• reduce annual NOx reductions by additional 4000 tons with measures implemented
in 2009
• reduce annual NOx reductions by additional 24 000 tons with measures imple-
mented in 2010
8Byggevareindustriens Forening, Fiskeb˚atredernes Forbund, Fiskeri og Havbruksnæringens
Landsforening, Fraktefartøyenes Rederiforening, Hurtigb˚atenes Rederiforbund, NHO Luftfart,
NHO Reiseliv, Norges Fiskarlag, Norges Rederiforbund, Norsk Fjernvarme, Norsk Industri,
Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon, Oljeindustriens Landsforening and Rederienes Landsforening
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Altogether this means that they undertake to implement measures that sum up
to 30 000 tons NOx emissions lower than business as usual level. The emission
factors mainly from shipping and fishing were downscaled, so that these sectors got
their total emissions reduced by 14 000 tons of NOx.9 10 This meant that instead
of the fund having to reduce their emissions with 30 000 tons of NOx, they had
committed themselves to only reducing 16 000 tons of NOx. December 14th 2010
a new NOx Agreement was signed for the period 2011 - 2017 on a further NOx
emission reduction of 16 000 tons of NOx by the end of 2017.
9When calculating the total NOx reductions, the use of fuel is multiplied by an emission
factor(NOx emission per liter use of fuel).
10Because of analysis performed by Statistics Norway.
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2 Voluntary Agreements
One of the most striking developments with regards to environmental policy design
in the 1990’s was the progress of a ”voluntary approach” to pollution abatement,
where firms make commitments to improve their environmental performance above
and beyond the level required by law (Lyon and Maxwell, 2000). According to Lyon
and Maxwell there exists three different types of voluntary agreements; unilateral
commitments by industrial firms, public voluntary schemes and negotiated agree-
ments created out of a dialog between government authorities and industry. The
NOx-fund is an example of an agreement of the last type. This type of agreement
typically contains a target and an associated timetable. These types of agreements
also take on the status of legally binding contracts if legislation empowers the gov-
ernment to sign them, and both business and government are active participants.
The negotiated agreements are more common in Europe than in the United
States. Some would say this is because of the tradition of relatively cooperative
business/government relations. Some examples of government-industry negotiated
agreements include the French agreement of end-of-life vehicles, the Swedish REPA-
scheme, the Swedish REP-system and the Dutch policy of a specific emission target
level in the chemical industry.11 12
Hansen (1999) divides voluntary agreements into three different groups which he
calls a) voluntary instruments that do not involve the public directly, b) voluntary
instruments involving the public and c) voluntary instruments that allow firms
to choose from different regulatory schemes. In the first category promotion of
energy savings is included, and could be understood as subsidizing development or
supply of preferred technologies and subsidies for provision of costly information
to firms. These subsidy based instruments have non-negative net income effects
for the polluting firms, and thus implies that the regulator accepts that firms have
the right to pollute. In this case the polluting firms have no reason to oppose
implementation of policies like this, and they may be said to be more voluntary for
11The REPA-scheme is an agreement to produce responsible packaging and concerns the collec-
tion, recycling and material recovery of waste from packaging.
12The REP-system is a refunded emission programs, concerning NOx-emissions.
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firms than others. The NOx-Fund share several of the same type of descriptions
as Hansen states, and one might suggest that the agreement is a pure gain for the
firms. The term voluntary agreements is also used for advanced versions of hard
regulatory instruments, that specify that a firm may be exempted from standard
regulation if it agrees to undertake alternative measures to achieve the same goals.
Firms implicitly reveal private information about their costs to the regulator, by
choosing from a menu of regulatory contracts. Depending on how these contracts
are constructed, different schemes may induce different behavior that in some cases
can increase efficiency of the regulator.
Hansen (1999) also presents a model where voluntary agreements involve a di-
rect negotiation between the industry and a regulatory body (government), and
thus avoiding the legislative process. Voluntary agreements produce no tax rev-
enue compared to standard environmental regulation, and compliance with these
voluntary agreements may be more or less costly than compliance with legislative
requirements. He also presents an extension of the model where he includes various
interest groups, who are publicly criticizing the actors responsible for their deci-
sions. The result here is that legislators are scared of public criticism and thereby
delegate too much power to regulators, who may lack incentives to maximize wel-
fare. In light of his analysis, this suggests that the government is scared of public
criticism if they don’t manage to reach their environmental goal, and therefore give
too much responsibility to the NOx-fund.
The empirical literature on voluntary environmental agreements is thin, and the
few papers that undertake quantitative analyses of corporate environmental actions
have dealt with discrete choice decisions, for example Khanna and Damon (1999),
Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) and Arora and Cason (1996). Such econometric
models look at a pollution-reduction program with two possible choices, to join
or not. They estimate the following model yi = βxi + ui, where i = 1, 2, ..., n
firms, using standard probit or logit models, where yi = 1 if the firm chooses to
join the program and 0 otherwise.13 xi is a vector of explanatory variables, where
13See Kenneth E. Train: Discrete Choice Methods with Simulations, Cambridge University
Press; Second Edition (2009).
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these typically are firm level data such as financial data, advertising intensity, R&D
intensity, firm size, previous emission levels and so on. ui is a random error term
with mean zero. What they want to find in these models is E(yi|xi) = βxi, which
is interpreted as the probability that a firm with characteristics xi will join the
voluntary program. In my analysis I do not have this type of firm level data and
is unable to do a similar analysis. Also, I only have data on the firms that are
members of the fund and applies for funding, so a more thorough econometric
analysis is unfortunately not possible.
Karamanos (2001) divide voluntary environmental agreements into four defin-
ing characteristics: 1) They are voluntary, 2) the primary objective is to improve
environmental conditions, 3) they are based on some type of formal or informal
agreement and 4) they can be developed between various sectors such as corporate
and government sector, corporate and non-profit sectors, government and non-profit
sectors or between all three sectors. He points out that although industry associ-
ations are non-profit organizations, his study treats them as part of the corporate
sector because they represent corporate interests. In terms of his definition, the
NOx-fund would be characterized as the corporate sector, although the fund is a
non-profit organization. He uses the definition of what a voluntary environmental
agreement is from Long and Arnold (1995), who suggests that voluntary environ-
mental agreements are ”agreements among the corporate, government, and/or non-
profit sectors not required by legislation that aim to improve environmental quality
or natural resource utilization”. He chooses to use this definition as it captures
all four of his own characteristics. He agrees with Lober (1997), which says that
”The environmental solutions that voluntary environmental collaborations seek are
an extension of those occurring or likely to occur in the regulatory arena rather than
a dramatic departure”, and states that voluntary environmental agreements do not
represent a radical change from the existing regulatory framework.
Arora and Cason (1996) examines why firms participate in voluntary environ-
mental programs and look at the US EPA 33/50 program.14 They conclude that
14The goal was to reduce the releases and transfers of 17 toxic chemicals by 50% between 1988
and 1995.
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this voluntary agreement approach may have the potential to become an effective
means of achieving environmental protection and argues that over compliance may
result from irregular/uneven investments in pollution abatement, which could result
in substantial cost savings in the long run.
The main analysis of their article is an econometric specification like the one
presented above, and their main findings is that the largest firms with the greatest
toxic releases are the most likely participants of the voluntary agreements. Also
there is no evidence that firms free-ride when comparing to the emission reductions
prior to the program’s initiation.
Sterner and Turnheim (2009) have done a study of the Swedish REP-program.
They study the process of the technical change and innovation, adoption and dif-
fusion of technology. They find that the best firms15 have reduced their emissions
by 70% and the median firms have caught up with best practice. However, the
Swedish NOx policy is different from the NOx-Fund. In Sweden, taxes are paid to
the government and then distributed back to the firms depending on their relative
output levels (Fredriksson and Sterner, 2005). The firms with the lowest emission
intensities become net beneficiaries of the system, whereas those with above-average
emission intensities make a net payment. In Norway, this is not the case, depending
on industry they pay different tax to the NOx fund, and get different funding or no
funding for investing in new capital equipment that reduce the NOx emissions.
15Defines best as the firms with the lowest emission intensities.
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3 Theoretical Model
3.1 A Model for Emission Reduction
We look at a sector consisting of firms that produce the same commodity, for
instance say we either just look at the fishing industry or the shipping sector. The
production causes emission, combustion of fuel that creates NOx emission, denoted
e, that has a negative impact on the environment. Emissions is a function of
investment in capital equipment I, where the firm can invest in new technology
that can reduce its emissions. We consider all investments as abatement activities
that have a durable effect on emissions.
3.1.1 Standard Tax System
I assume that all firms are price-takers and will maximize their profit. I will set up
the minimization problem for each firm and they will minimize their costs according
to
Min ci(ai) + tei (1)
with respect to ei, where ai = E
0 − ei. ai is abatement and E0 is the business as
usual level of emissions, which is the firm’s emission level if there is no environmental
policy. We assume that the production is given and unaffected by investments in
abatement technologies. t is the unit price of emission per kilo and ci(a) is the
abatement cost function, which is increasing and convex in abatement, c′(0) = 0,
c′(a) > 0 and c′′(a) > 0. We do not look at abatement as a reduction of the firms
quantity produced, as we have assumed that this is constant, but only as abatement
when the firm is investing in new capital equipment.
We differentiate with respect to ei to get the first order condition for interior
maximum.
c′i(a)(−1) + t = 0
c′i(a) = t (2)
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Figure 3.1: The abatement cost function
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If t = 0, there is no regulation. Firms would behave with setting c′i(a) = 0, meaning
that E0 = ei. The firm would have emissions at the firm’s optimal level (profit
maximizing level of emissions), setting their emission equal to the business as usual
level of emissions. A consequence when there is no regulation is that there will be
zero abatement, E0 = ei and hence a = 0. There will be no new investments in new
capital equipment, I = 0. When there is a tax on emissions t > 0, emissions are
costly due to the emission tax. The cost minimizing firm will reduce its emissions
and choose c′(a) > 0. The higher the tax is, the more will the firm reduce its
emissions.
Emissions are reduced by increasing the investment in capital equipment. ai(Ij)
is abatement as a function of investment in capital equipment. The abatement
function is increasing and convex in investment, a′i(Ij) > 0 and a
′′
i (Ij) > 0.
3.1.2 Investment Based Funding: The Norwegian NOx-Fund
Now we assume that each firm can apply for funding that will cover parts of their
investment expenditures. We include this funding as a subsidy, s, for durable
abatement investments. s is a share of the total investment subsidy that the firm
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gets funding for, so (1 − s)pjIj is the part of the investment that the firm has to
cover. There are different projects to invest in, Ij, where j = 1, 2, ..., n represents
the different projects. Each project has different prices pj.
We assume that c(a) = pjI(a) so that, c
′(ai) = pjI ′j(ai). The firms apply for
funding from the NOx-fund, which is the same as the one’s charging the tax. The
budget constraint for the NOx-fund is t
∑
ei = s
∑
pjIj.
In this case we have two different approaches. Either s could be fixed and
the investment support could be rationed, or s could be endogenous according to
the budget constraint of the NOx-fund. In fact, considering s as fixed and the
investment support rationed is quite close to the current design of the Norwegian
NOx-fund, and is hence what I will focus on further. Investment projects will
be approved until the total budget t
∑
ei is spent. It appears unlikely that this
mechanism has implied that the best investment projects have been realized. I
will expand further on this topic later by introducing hidden information about the
firms abatement cost into the model in chapter 5, and a theoretical evaluation of
the fund follows. The cost minimization problem for the firm is:
Min(1− s)pjIj(ai) + tei (3)
and we differentiate with respect to ei and assume we have an interior solution, to
get:
(1− s)pjI ′j(ai)(−1) + t = 0
pjI
′
j(ai) =
t
(1− s)
c′(ai) =
t
(1− s) (4)
(4) is the optimality condition for a fund system. If we compare the first order
condition for the standard tax system to the investment based funding, (2) and (4),
we see that if the tax is the same in the two cases, the investment in abatement
technology would be greater in the fund system because of the subsidy. When
t is equal, the marginal abatement cost is increased by a factor 1
(1−s) , and thus
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investments will amplify. This happens when si = sj.
We know that t is not equal in the two systems. In the tax system t = 17
NOK/kg NOx emission, and in the fund system either t = 4 NOK/kg or t = 11
NOK/kg NOx emission. By adjusting s according to the level of t, one could reach
the same solution in both the tax and fund systems, for example t = t
(1−s) = 17
NOK/kg NOx emission.
Although it is possible to reach the same solution in the two systems, we know
that different subsidies are given to different projects in the fund system, si 6= sj,
and some do not receive a subsidy at all. In that case the marginal abatement
cost will differ across firms, c′(ai) 6= c′(aj), and abatement is not cost effectively
distributed.
3.2 Comparing a tax, fund and subsidy system
I want to look at the advantages and disadvantages between different environmen-
tal policy designs and analyze their implications. It is known in environmental
economics that an emission tax and abatement subsidy gives different incentives,
and I want to compare a tax, a fund and a subsidy system.
Starting out with the revenues of the three methods, if assuming that all three
designs have the same target of abatement, a, we know that a tax on emissions will
lead to a tax income of t∗
∑
ei, whereas a fund system will have zero public revenue
and an abatement subsidy will have an income of −s∑ ai, where s = t and hence
an income of −t∑ ai.
Now we do not look at a given level of abatement, a. If the number of firms in
the industry are endogenous, when using an abatement subsidy the industry will
now be more profitable compared to no policy, and this will attract more firms
to the industry and the total number of firms will rise. On the other side, when
the number of firms are endogenous, an emission tax will make the industry less
profitable and the total number of firms will decrease. The effect on total emissions
is an unambiguous reduction, as the tax both reduces emissions from existing firms
and could decrease the total number of firms. The effect on total emissions when
using an abatement subsidy is uncertain, but what we know is that total emissions
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are higher with a subsidy than with a tax, and it might even be higher than with no
regulation. Thus an abatement subsidy will prevent that non-profitable firms fail,
because it makes the industry as a whole more profitable (Perman and M.Common,
2003).
When looking at revenue to the government, a fund system is neutral in the
way that it neither creates income nor expenditures, and at the same time reduces
emissions by the same amount. When comparing a tax system to a subsidy, both
can reach the same level of emission reduction, but the tax creates revenue and the
subsidy creates expenditures.
In a way one can analyze the fund system as an earmarked tax. Buchanan
(1963) defines earmarking as the practice of dedicating specific revenues to the
financing of specific public services. Some argue that earmarking tend to reduce
the willingness of taxpayers to approve expenditures on specific public services
(Margolis, 1961), while others sees earmarking as a device for generating taxpayer
support for expansion in particular services (Rolph and Break, 1949).
Oates (1995) states that if pollution taxes are drained off into trust funds, this
will result in increased spending, which in turn means that certain environmental
projects are likely to be undertaken simply because there is unused money in the
fund. He argues that environmental projects should have to be met by the same
economic and budgetary tests as other projects, and not be undertaken simply
because of the availability of some earmarked funds.
Oates (1995) states that rather than an environmental trust fund, a more ap-
pealing approach is a revenue neutral tax package which works in a way that new
taxes on pollution can be combined with reduction in other taxes, that will generate
support for the proposed reform. He uses the Swedish environmental tax reform as
an example (Sterner, 1994), where taxes on CO2 and sulfur emissions were intro-
duced, and he suggests that such revenue-neutral reforms also can address equity
issues. Pollution taxes play a positive and significant role in the revenue system,
reduce levels of polluting activities and provide important incentives for research
efforts into new and improved abatement technologies (Oates, 1995), and therefore
Oates argues that it is better to use a pollution tax, and if necessary combine the
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tax with other policy instruments.
3.3 Theoretical evaluation of the NOx-Fund
We have seen that if the same tax level is applied in a fund- and tax system, abate-
ment would be higher in the case of a fund because investment in new abatement
technology is higher when a subsidy is given to the firms. However, the tax is not
the same as it is 17 NOK/kg NOx emission in the case of a tax, and in a fund system
it is either 4 or 11 NOK/kg NOx emission. By adjusting the subsidy according to
the level of the tax, one could reach the same solution in both the tax and fund
systems. As the subsidy differs between different types of investment, it is thus
unlikely that one reaches the same solution as in a tax system.
At the same time a fund system is neutral in government revenue, as it neither
creates income nor expenditures. As the total budget of the firm, t
∑
ei, is likely
to be used, it appears unlikely that this leads to only investment in the most cost
efficient projects. This is also pointed out by Oates (1995).
Another point worthy of mention is that from a public revenue point of view the
oil and gas industry has a marginal income tax of 78%, while the other industries
have a marginal income tax of 28%. This means that expenditures from the oil
industry to a large extent is paid by the government. The oil and gas industry
pay the largest share of the total income to the fund, as their fee is higher.16 This
implies that the NOx fund to a large part is funded by lost revenue from the oil
and gas industry.
1611NOK/kg NOx emission is paid to the fund only by the oil and gass industry. The rest of
the members pay a fee of 4NOK/kg NOx emission.
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4 The political economy of the NOx-fund
Environmental policy reform often faces stiff resistance from industry lobby groups
(Fredriksson and Sterner, 2005). In Norway there has been hard resistance from
lobby groups against having to pay taxes on pollution and other taxes in general.17
When the tax on NOx emissions was introduced in Norway in 2007, this received a
wave of protests especially from the cruise and shipping industry (Axelsen, 2007).
The argument used by the industry is that if they have to face higher taxes in
Norway than elsewhere, this would be a great economic burden for an internation-
ally exposed industry. Thus, rather than having to pay high taxes on emissions,
the shipping industry would decide to register its entire fleet abroad. As it is im-
portant for the Norwegian government to implement policies to make Norwegian
companies competitive on the world market, this resistance affects the preferences
of the politicians. There is thus a trade off between political feasibility and cost
efficiency.
The analysis in chapter 3 showed that when the number of firms in the indus-
try are endogenous, an emission tax will make the industry less profitable, some
firms will go bankrupt and the total number of firms will decline. This is an un-
wanted policy implication for the government, and might be an explanation to why
implementability of abatement is prioritized over cost efficiency.
Fredriksson and Sterner (2005) examine how lobbying from the industry affect
the refunded emissions payment programs (REPs) in Sweden, where the pollution
tax proceeds are refunded to the collective tax-paying polluters in proportion to
their output shares. The generated tax revenues are returned to firms based on
their relative output levels, and firms cleaner than the average receive refunds that
are larger than their tax payments. This could possibly be more than enough to
compensate for abatement costs. Fredriksson and Sterner (2005) put up a model
where they assume the existence of a REP program and looks at how two types of
lobbying firms with different abatement technologies affects the pollution tax.
17The resistance showed itself particularly when Norges Rederiforbund sued the Norwegian
government because of a tax that had to be paid back to the government, and won the case in
Supreme Court in 2008.
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They find that without a REP system the two firms exert resistance towards
the pollution tax, as reflected by the unambiguously negative political pressure
from the two lobbies. When comparing this to the case where a REP system is
present, it reduces the political lobbying on the pollution tax, meaning that the
REP program creates a powerful constituency in support of a higher pollution tax.
In a REP program, equilibrium firms with relatively low pollution intensity may
lobby for a higher tax, because it benefits sufficiently from the refunds to outweigh
its abatement cost.
Sterner and Turnheim (2009) argues that in a REP system, one benefit of com-
bining a tax with a refund is its political economy. Although the abatement incen-
tives are practically the same as for a tax of the same value, polluters are less averse
to the REP scheme. This can be explained by the fact that the marginal cost of
abatement is essentially the same as the fee level, but the average net payment is
much lower due to the refund. Potential resistance is defused and lobbying from
the polluters is reduced. Some of the same arguments can be applied to the NOx
fund, and at the same time the marginal cost of abatement is even lower than for
a tax, which make polluters even less averse to the fund system.
Fredriksson (1997) argues that one reason for why governments do not internalize
fully the environmental externalities is that they do not maximize welfare, but rather
maximize a utility function which also includes the influence of a special interest
group. Governments thus set up environmental policy which differ from the first
best solution. The result is that the political equilibrium tax rate on pollution
differs from the Pigouvian tax rate, because of lobby groups and the government’s
weight on social welfare relative to lobbying activities.
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5 The Marginal Abatement Cost Function
5.1 Description of the data
The data used to evaluate the NOx fund comes from the NOx-fund itself and Det
Norske Veritas (DNV).18 Firms that apply for funding must report what kind of
initiative they are applying for, how much NOx reduction they expect, how much
fuel they believe they will use after the new investment has been completed, how
much money they are applying for and the private cost of the investment. This data
is available on the website of the NOx-fund together with a detailed description of
each initiative.
The role of DNV is to secure the quality of each application, give recommenda-
tions to the NOx-fund about what kind of initiatives they should prioritize in order
to reach their agreed volume of abatement, and to find the most cost efficient use
of the money from the fund.19 Thus, DNV has a regulating role.
The rest of the data I have used stems from DNV’s calculations about the cost
of NOx reduction per project, and the cost of NOx reduction per project in total.
Here I focus only on the total costs, as I am interested in looking at the total use of
resources in this case, and not only on the money used from the fund. The reason
for doing this is because I want to look at the total cost of the NOx reduction, and
not the total cost of the NOx fund.
One great disadvantage with using this type of data is that I have not been able
to do the calculations on the costs myself. These calculations contain data both from
projects that will be carried out within the two next years, and verified projects.
The assumptions about life expectancy of the investment, the annuity factor and
interest rate are all made by DNV, and this limits the analysis of the data. However,
as DNV is an expert in this field, I assume that it is safe to trust their assumptions
and rather use my thesis to analyze their calculations in an economic perspective.
18www.dnv.no
19www.nho/nox
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5.2 Description of the initiatives
In this part I will briefly explain the different initiatives that receive funding from
the NOx fund in order to reduce the emissions. Hence, the following measures are
examples of new investment projects.
Selective Catalytic Reduction(SCR):
SCR is the most widely used measure in cleansing of NOx in exhaust. By adding
urea or ammonia to the catalytic process it converts NOx to N2 and H2O. A SCR
installation consist of a SCR-reactor, a tank, pump and control system to dose
ammonia/urea. It is technically possible to reach a NOx-reduction on over 95% by
installation SCR, and SCR are installed at all different type of ships and vessels
such as offshore supply vessels, fishing vessels, offshore special vessels and anchor
handling thug supply vessels.20
Exhaust Gas Recirculation(EGR):
EGR is a NOx emission reduction technique used in petrol and diesel engines by
recirculating exhaust gas into the engine’s cylinders. This is installed mainly on off-
shore special vessels and passenger vessels. The exhaust gas that is used is cooled
over a heat exchanger, and the NOx reduction depends on the temperature in the
combustion chamber.
Fuelsaving:
Fuel saving could be installation of supply meter, fuel meter, change of screw and
other similar installations to optimize the loading plan of the cargo on the ship
or reduce the use of fuel, that is installed mainly on fishing vessels and passenger
ships/ferry’s.
Gas:
Gas (land based and offshore/shipping) is investment in new capital equipment to
change from existing technology to gas. One separates between land based industry
20Many of these vessels supply oil rigs and offshore oil platforms, others ships used to catch fish
in the sea and some are merchant ships to transport different type of cargo.
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and others, which are chemical- and shuttle tankers, bulk cargo and offshore supply
vessels.
Change of the engine and motor technical rebuilding:
Change of engine is an initiative that consists of changing the engine to a new
one that has lower NOx emissions, and are installed at fishing vessels and passen-
ger/car ferry’s. Motor technical rebuilding is almost the same as change of the
engine, only that parts of the engine is changed and not the whole engine, and is
also installed at fishing vessels and passenger ferry’s, but also on bulk vessels, cargo
ships, drilling rigs and shuttle tankers. This also contains initiatives that rebuild
the fueling system in order to use less rich oil and more diesel, which emits less NOx.
Process optimizing:
Process optimizing are initiatives mainly made by energy companies such as Statoil-
Hydro and landbased industry. Process optimizing are investments that optimizes
the excising process in turbines, heating furnaces, raw material installations etc.
Injection and emulsion of water:
Water injection is a method used in internal combustion turbines to secure a lower
and more even temperature in the combustion chambers of engines, by adding water
so that the production of NOx is reduced. By waterinjection the emissions of NOx
will depend upon what kind of volumes of water that is injected in the turbine.
Water emulsion entails improved combustion with lower use of burning oil, cleaner
engine and reduces the emissions of NOx and other particles. Both are installed at
offshore supply vessels, fishing vessels and chemical tankers.
5.3 Method used
I want to find the aggregate marginal abatement cost curve over all the firms and
ships that are members of the Nox-fund. However, not all the firms that are mem-
bers of the fund apply for funding, and there are a lot of uncertainty concerning
the firms that no not apply, as we do not have much information about them.
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We start out with the abatement cost curve for the firms that have applied
for funding. This curve both includes the verified projects and projects that have
applied for funding and will be undertaking investments in the near future. The
average abatement cost for each project is calculated in the following way:
Ci =
Ii ∗ f + ci − Si
ai
(5)
f =
i[(1 + i)T ]
(1 + i)T − 1 (6)
Where Ci is the mean cost per kilogram NOx reduction in project i, Ii is investment
in new technology, f is the annuity factor, ci is yearly extra production costs due to
the investment, si is yearly savings due to the investment and ai is yearly abatement
measured in kilos of NOx. In order to calculate the annuity factor a discount rate
of i = 7% is used and the lifetime, T = [15, 30], is assumed to be either 15 years
or 30 years. Thus, when the lifetime is 15 years the annuity factor is 10,98%
and a lifetime of 30 years gives an annuity factor of 8,06%. As mentioned, these
assumptions are made by DNV. If one requires a higher rate of return than 7%,
f will increase and this makes the average costs higher. If i is higher than 7% we
are thus underestimating the actual costs of the capital investments. SFT are also
using i = 7%, so our estimates of the costs are in accordance with their predictions.
We see that by using the annuity method we get the average cost of each project
measured in NOK per kilo Nox reduction. I assume that the condition for a firm
to apply for funding is
(Ii − Fi)f + ci − Si ≥ t∆ei (7)
which states that the present value of the private cost of the investment for project
i, (Ii−Fi)f , where Fi is the funding received from the NOx-fund, must be at least as
high as the taxes they would have to pay yearly on their emissions. This condition
thus states that a firm will not apply for funding if it is not in its own interest to
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do so. The ships that implement new investments are at the same time in dock for
other maintenance purposes. This suggests that the present value of the private
cost of the investment do not exceed the taxes they would have to pay on emissions
yearly, if the cost of off-hire was included.
5.4 Graphical Representation
The average cost per project is calculated, and when I put all of these together in
one graph I call it the marginal abatement cost curve, as it shows the marginal cost
of a new project measured in NOK per kilo NOx reduction. In all the graphs the
projects are sorted by increasing costs per unit abatement, and plotted against each
other with accumulated NOx-reduction on the x-axis. Graph 5.1 is a representation
Graph 5.1: Total marginal abatement cost curve, measured in NOK/kg NOx re-
duction. Accumulated NOx reduction measured in tons on the x-axis.
of all the projects. It shows us that there are several projects with a negative average
cost, and some with an average cost above 500 NOK per kilo NOx reduction. When
the average abatement cost is negative, this means that there is a positive gain
represented by increased profit for the firm by investing in the new technology. At
the same time we see that there are many projects with an average cost between 0
and 100 NOK/kg NOx reduction. In total there are 102 projects with a marginal
cost below or equal to 0 NOK. As the minimum observation is -2177.71 and the
maximum observation is 734.22, we see that there is a great spread in the data, and
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Table 5.1: Data from DNV. Average abatement cost is measured in NOK/kg NOx
reduction, total NOx reduction measured in tons.
Initiative Number of
projects
Average abate-
ment cost
Total NOx
reduction
Percentage
of NOx-red.
SCR 163 19.6 13 935 53.4
Fuelsaving 118 -47.5 1 697 6.5
EGR 7 95.4 103.9 0.4
Gas 23 25.1 3 423 13.1
Gas -Landbased 16 75 261 1
Change of engine 16 35.6 390 1.5
Motortechnical re-
building
119 14.3 4 772 18.3
Process Optimizing 21 1.9 1 142 4.4
Emulsion of Water 8 15.1 243 0.9
Injection of Water 4 3.8 110 0.4
Sum 495 23.8 26078 1
this makes it difficult to draw conclusions out of this graph. Still, it might suggest
that the projects with a negative marginal cost should have been carried out without
needing support from the fund, as they give a positive result to the firm. At the
same time there are some projects that have a very high positive average abatement
cost, and we want to look closer into what might characterize these projects. In
table 5.1 I have sorted all the projects according to the different initiatives and
calculated the average abatement cost, total NOx reduction of each initiative and
the percentage of total NOx reduction. Table 5.1 show that SCR contribute to over
50% of the total emission reduction and is the initiative that is most represented
among the projects. This suggests that we should analyze these projects further.
As there are 163 measures of SCR, this adds up to 33% of all the projects. The
initiatives fuel saving, motor technical rebuilding, process optimizing, emulsion and
injection of water all have an average abatement cost lower than the emission tax of
17NOK/kg NOx. Fuel saving, process optimizing and injection of water all has an
average cost lower than the fee of 4NOK/kg NOx. This suggests that rather than
paying the fee to the NOx fund, it would have been cost minimizing to undertake
investments in new capital equipment. In table 5.2 I have calculated the standard
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics. Average abatement cost for each initiative is
measured in NOK/kg NOx reduction.
Initiative Average
ab.cost
Std. Dev. Min value Max value CV
SCR 19.6 11.8 -2.97 87.7 0.6
Fuelsaving -47.5 237.7 -2177.7 734.2 5
EGR 95.4 162.3 15.83 460.9 1.7
Gas 25.1 23.7 1.93 124.4 0.9
Gas-Landbased 75 109.2 -146.2 289.7 1.5
Change of Engine 35.6 39.1 -0.12 142.3 1.1
Motortechnical re-
building
14.3 24.2 -119.7 110.5 1.7
Process Optimizing 1.9 243.3 -611.2 548.95 127.4
Emulsion of Water 15.1 18.1 1.71 50.8 1.2
Injection of Water 3.8 2 2.4 6.7 0.5
deviation and put up the minimum and maximum value for each initiative. The
last column CV is the coefficient of variation, calculated CV = σ|µ| , and it gives
the standard deviation as a proportion of the mean. Coefficient of variations are
often more meaningful than standard deviations, as it is a normalized measure of
the disparity of the distribution of the data (Rice, 2007). Here we see that there
are great differences between the projects, for instance the minimum and maximum
values differ a lot between the categories. As the coefficient of variation shows how
large spread there is within each of the initiatives marginal cost, a large coefficient
of variation suggests that the marginal cost for that initiative varies a lot. This
is the case for optimizing the process, where we see that the average cost ranges
from -611.19 to 548.95, and for fuel saving where it ranges from -2177.71 to 734.22.
These two are the measures that stand out with a particular high coefficient of
variation, while rebuilding of the engine has the third highest measure. Because we
are comparing within categories, this suggests that some projects are more efficient
than others, or use their resources in a better way than others. Another explanation
could be that we are comparing planned and verified projects.
In graph 5.2 only the marginal cost of each SCR initiative is plotted against
the accumulated NOx reduction for this initiative. We see from graph 4.2 that the
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Graph 5.2: Marginal abatement cost SCR, measured in NOK/kg NOx reduction.
Accumulated NOx reduction measured in tons on the x-axis. 163 observations
marginal abatement cost curve for SCR is steadily increasing (with some positive
extreme values, 7 observations with a value above 40 NOK/kg NOx reduction), and
the average abatement cost for this measure is 4 NOK below the total average. SCR
is an end of pipe type of cleaning, because it is installed near the end of the engine
exhaustpipe to reduce the emissions that have already been formed in the engine.
It could potentially be installed in the majority of the ships, and SFT suggested
that if SCR were installed on all the potential ships it would have reduced the
NOx-emissions by 43 000 tons. Therefore one could look further into the aggregate
marginal abatement cost function assuming that, as a modest estimate, there are
twice as many ships left that can invest in SCR and reduce their emissions.21
Table 5.1 also shows that the motor technical rebuilding contributes with 18,3%
of the total NOx-reduction, while changing the use from fuel to gas contributes with
13,13%. 119 of the projects are motor technical rebuilding, and graph 5.3 shows
that there are both projects with positive and negative average abatement costs.
The average abatement cost of these initiatives are 14.29. 8 of the 119 initiatives
have a average cost below or equal to zero, whereas the remaining 111 initiatives
has a positive average cost. The average cost of these 111 initiatives measured in
NOK/kg NOx reduction is 17.17, which still is below the total average and also
21This means installing SCR at 326 ships. SFT assumes that SCR is installed at 576 ships in
their analysis.
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Graph 5.3: Marginal abatement cost curve for motor technical rebuilding measured
in NOK/kg NOx reduction. Accumulated NOx reduction measured in tons on the
x-axis. 8 observations below or equal to zero, 9 observations above 40 NOK/kg
NOx reduction.
still below SCR. At the same time, it has the third highest coefficient of variation.
Summing up, the initiative motor technical rebuilding thus has a fairly low average
cost and also contributes to 18% of the total NOx reductions.
Graph 5.4: Marginal abatement cost for changing from fuel to gas, measured in
NOK/kg NOx reduction. Accumulated NOx reduction measured in tons on the
x-axis.
There are 23 projects changing from existing technology to gas on ships. Most
of these are carried out at offshore supply vessels, which is a ship used to sup-
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ply offshore oil platforms, and bulk vessels which is a merchant ship to transport
unpackaged bulk cargo. I have excluded the last observation, because it had an av-
erage abatement cost 2,5 times higher than the previous observation.22 All of these
measures were either implemented by the end of 2010 or will be installed in 2011
and 2012. We could assume that there will be more initiatives of ships switching to
gas in the coming years, which could contribute to increasing the NOx-reductions
at a reasonable price, as the average cost is 25 NOK/kg NOx reduction.23 The
updated lists on the web page of the NOx-Fund shows that since December 2010
there has been five new applications for investment in gas.
In total 85% of the total NOx-reduction come from these SCR, gas and motor
technical rebuilding. From table 4.3 we see that they also have an average abatement
cost around or below the total average abatement cost.
The measure with the lowest average cost is the initiative fuel saving. This
initiative has such a low average abatement cost that one could start questioning
why they need a subsidy for their investments in new technology, as this investment
should have been profitable for the firm.
Graph 5.5: Marginal abatement cost curve for fuelsaving, measured in NOK/kg
NOx reduction. Accumulated NOx reduction measured in tons on the x-axis.
84 of the 118 fuel saving measures has a negative average abatement cost, which
shows that the majority of the projects which has a negative average abatement
22The reason for doing this is to make the picture clearer. It is easier represented in a graph
like this, and has no other purpose.
23In conversation with Geir Høiby, leader of the NOx-fund, he assumed that there will be more
of this type of measures in the future.
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cost is a result of fuel saving initiatives.
5.4.1 Analysis of the initiatives
The fuel saving measures are mostly carried out on passenger ships and fishing
vessels. They pay a fee to the NOx-fund of 4 NOK/kg NOx-emission and at the same
time receive funding for investments that benefit themselves, as it has a negative
average cost, meaning that they will benefit directly from the investment. How
much is invested of the money from the NOx-fund into each project? This question
remains unanswered, as we do not have the exact information about their investment
costs and support given from the NOx-fund, but I will try to estimate how large
the costs are.
Many firms operate with a required rate of return of 7%. When risk is greater
they operate with a higher required rate of return, which could be the case for the
shipping industry. Therefore, it is likely that investing in new capital equipment
would not be profitable for the firms if they did not receive funding. The majority of
the projects have an expected lifetime of 15 years. From the firms point of view, the
question is not only about cost efficiency in the long run, but also about liquidity
constraints in the short run and the alternative costs of the private investment cost.
If we assume that the firm has no preferences for a clean environment, it is hard to
believe that they would prioritize these projects before other projects, which could
give them higher returns in the short-run.
One possible explanation for why some average costs are so much higher than
others is that they have granted funding to almost all applying projects. As new
investments only are profitable when they are in dock for other maintenance pur-
poses, this might suggest that one needs more time in order to reach a more cost
efficient solution. If the fund had a longer time horizon, then one would have the
possibility to prioritize the most cost efficient investments over others. This also
suggests that if one uses a tax on emissions, it is necessary to announce the tax
in advance, in order for investments to be undertaken when it is profitable for the
firm.
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5.4.2 Splitting up the abatement cost
As the total marginal abatement cost curve in graph 5.1 has such a wide spread, I
will divide it into three parts, according to the increasing costs. Graph 5.6 shows
the initiatives with an average cost up to NOK 0, graph 5.7 shows the initiatives
with a average cost up to 70 NOK/kg NOx reduction and graph 5.8 shows the last
34 observations with a cost above 70/kg NOx reduction. In graph 5.6 I have plotted
Graph 5.6: Part 1 of the marginal cost function, measured in NOK/kg NOx reduc-
tion. Accumulated NOx reduction measured in tons on the x-axis. Observation 1
to 102 out of the total 495 variables, 102 observations.
observation 103 to 461, which are the values which has a cost between 0 NOK and
70 NOK/kg NOx reduction.
Here we see that the projects with negative average costs contribute with a
NOx reduction of around 2000 tons, the projects with average costs between 0 to
70 NOK/kg NOx contribute with 23 000 tons of NOx, and the projects with an
average cost above 70 NOK/kg NOx contribute with 850 tons of NOx. This might
suggest that graph 5.6 shows the projects that do not need funding, as they give
a positive profit to the firms, and graph 5.8 shows the projects that one can argue
should not have been granted funding for their investments because they have too
high average abatement costs. Graph 5.7 shows that the majority of the projects
are represented in the group that reduce NOx the most. This suggest that the
majority of the implemented projects are among the most cost efficient.
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Graph 5.7: Part 2 of the marginal cost function, measured in NOK/kg NOx reduc-
tion. Accumulated NOx reduction measured in tons on the x-axis. Observation 103
to 461 out of the total 495 variables, 359 observations.
Graph 5.8: Part 3 of the marginal cost function, measured in NOK/kg NOx reduc-
tion. Accumulated NOx reduction measured in tons on the x-axis. Observation 462
to 495 out of the total 495 variables, 34 observations.
5.5 The total costs
5.5.1 Total cost of the investments
I have made an overview of the total costs of the investment and expected total
funding from the fund, using the data presented on the website of the NOx-fund
(stemming from only applications, and not the verified projects as in table 5.1). This
table includes total costs of the investment, which is based on expected investment
costs and total funding, which is the expected support from the fund.24 In this
24We see that there are some differences between the two tables when it comes to number of
projects, as table 5.3 includes 24 more observations and is only based on applications and not on
34
section I argue why this cost is not suited as an estimate of the total cost for
NOx-reduction, but we can use the expected funding as an approximation.
Table 5.3 is based on applications from the NOx fund from 2008 to December
13th 2010. Total funding is summed to be 2 billion NOK, while total cost of the
investment is 9.3 billion. The total cost of investment does not include benefits of
the investment, such as reduction of fuel use and hence also reduced fuel expendi-
tures. These would be high, at least for some of the categories such as fuelsaving,
rebuilding- and change of the engine. The benefits in this case are savings in terms
of less use of fuel, as the reason for why these projects reduce their NOx emissions
are due to a reduction in fuel use. Hence, the total investment cost is large, but as
there are great expenditure savings due to less use of fuel, the ”total costs of the
investment” is not an accurate measure of the total costs of the NOx reduction.
Table 5.3 shows that they get funding that corresponds to the percentage of NOx
reduction. The measure SCR contributes with 55% of the total NOx reduction and
get 39,4% of the total funding. The initiative fuel saving have a 6,2 % share of the
total emissions and receive 7,1% of the total funding. However, we know that fuel
saving is a measure with a negative cost for the majority of the projects. 143,4
million NOK from the NOx fund is used on projects giving the firms a positive net
result. These applications show that the firms themselves have a cost of 1.26 billion,
which is unrealistic when we know that the cost for each project, when taking the
lifetime and other benefits into account, is negative.25 Thus, not taking into account
what the firm gains from this investment, is clearly not a realistic measure of the
actual costs for the reduction of NOx, but the expected funding can be used as an
approximation.
As the emission reductions are 1862 tons, their total savings over a 15 years
period from not having to pay the fee of 4 NOK/kg NOx would be 111,7 million
NOK. This makes it even clearer that it is not rational behavior to invest 1.26 billion
NOK to save 111,7 million NOK. For the analysis of total costs these numbers can
obviously not be applied. As this is the only information that is put on the web by
verified projects.
25Total cost minus total funding: 1,4 billion NOK - 143,4 million NOK = 1.26 billion NOK.
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the NOx-fund, one might get the impression that the shipping industry have high
investment costs and are cooperating in order to reduce their total emissions, when
they actually have a negative cost in the long run. The data in table 5.3 is thus an
overview of the total cost, but it is very difficult to get an accurate measure of the
total costs, as detailed micro level data is needed.
However, costs such as expenditures on labor, the loss of income when off-hire,
among others should also be taken into consideration in the total economic costs.
But as the workers on the ships/platforms need to be paid anyway, these are not
stated in the information from the NOx-fund, and hence neither taken into account
here.
Also, the ships that have completed new investments have been in-dock while
doing maintenance, which suggest that the loss of income when off-hire probably
would have happened anyway. Nevertheless, benefits such as reduced fuel expendi-
tures and other types of savings are not taken into consideration in the value total
cost. The total cost is just Ii in equation (10), and we do not have the values of si
and ci in the expression, therefore it is difficult to draw conclusions just out of the
value Ii, as si potentially could be very high as it contains savings of fuel expendi-
tures. Therefore, the numbers are clearly not suited for looking at the total cost of
NOx reduction, as there are other benefits for the firm due to the new investments.
5.5.2 Calculating the total costs according to the average costs
In order to find a good estimate of the total costs of the NOx reduction I multiply
the average cost of each project, Ci, by the respective NOx reduction, ai. The result
is then total cost of the project for the corresponding NOx reduction, and takes into
account both extra cost of the investment (urea costs if SCR) and savings (less fuel
expenditures), because this is reflected in the average cost. When summing the
costs for each project, we get the total costs of the NOx reduction for the given
level of abatement achieved. The total costs can be found in table 4.4, and are
plotted in a graph.
From graph 5.10 we see that at a total cost of 399 million NOK a NOx reduction
of 26 078 tons is reached. According to SFT’s analysis a NOx reduction of 43 000
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Table 5.4: Total costs of reducing the NOx emissions. Cost are measured in1000
NOK.
Initiative Sum costs Percentage of total costs
SCR 228 230.89 57.18
Fuelsaving 10 974.52 2.75
EGR 3 657.13 0.92
Gas 67 542.79 16.92
Gas-mainland 3 357.71 0.84
Change of the engine 9 069.88 2.27
Motortechnical rebuilding 47 217.88 11.83
Process optimizing 27 641.94 6.93
Emulsion of water 1 019.96 0.26
Injection of water 408.26 0.10
Sum 399 120.95 100.00
Graph 5.9: Total costs measured in 1000 NOK. Accumulated NOx reduction mea-
sured in tons on the x-axis.
tons could be reached at a total cost of 320 million NOK, if SCR was implemented
on all domestic ships and give an average cost of 7.44NOK/kg NOx reduction. This
corresponds to a total cost of 194 million NOK to reduce the NOx emissions with
26 078 tons. Up to a reduction of 8578 tons of NOx, the accumulated costs are
negative. This means that in total, the emission reductions up to around 8500 tons
gives a net positive result to the firms. It is clear that the NOx fund have reached
their emission reductions at a much higher total price than what SFT predicted.
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Graph 5.10: Accumulated total costs, measured in 1000 NOK. Accumulated NOx
reduction in tons at the x-axis.
5.6 Aggregate Marginal Abatement Cost Function
In this part of the analysis we will see what the aggregate marginal abatement
cost curve would have looked like when only some of the initiatives are followed
through, and there are more of each type of these projects. I use the costs from
the actual investments and look at what would have happened if only some of them
were funded, and what the marginal abatement cost curve would have looked like.
The motivation behind this analysis is to apply some assumptions to see weather
it is possible to reduce the emissions of NOx by the same amount as today, but at
a lower price. I also use the same method as 5.5.2 to find the total cost of the NOx
reduction in these hypothetical scenarios.
5.6.1 Scenario 1
Previously we have seen that SCR, gas and motor technical rebuilding are the
three measures that reduce NOx emissions the most. They also represent 62% of
the projects. I assume that there are twice as many of these projects, and look
what happens to the aggregate marginal abatement cost function. This is the same
assumption as saying, instead of there being 305 projects of these initiatives today,
assume that we have twice as many, 610 projects in total. As the total trade fleet
consists of around 1500 boats, I see this as a realistic assumption as this means
that the three measures could be installed at around 40% of the Norwegian trade
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fleet, compared to 20% today. In this scenario we see that the total NOx-reductions
Graph 5.11: Scenario 1, measured in NOK/kg NOx reduction. Accumulated NOx
reduction measured in tons on the x-axis.
would be 48 208 tons of NOx, compared to todays 26 078 tons. As we have seen
earlier there is a big difference between the cost efficiency of the projects, if one
only carries out the most cost efficient projects this will lead to more abatement
at a lower price. To get a clearer view of the picture in this scenario, we zoom in
at the graph. Graph 5.12 shows that a reduction of NOx of 26 000 tons could be
Graph 5.12: Scenario 1, zoomed. Margial cost measured in NOK/kg NOx reduction.
Accumulated NOx reduction measured in tons on the x-axis.
reached at a cost of 14.2 NOK/kg NOx reduction, which is clearly below todays
cost of 734 NOK/kg NOx reduction. However, as the average abatement cost of all
the projects are 23.8 NOK/kg NOx reduction, the least cost efficient one with an
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average cost of 734 NOK/kg NOx reduction is rather an exemption.26 Thereafter
we find the total costs using the same method as previously. In this scenario it is
Graph 5.13: Scenario 1: Total costs measured in 1000 NOK. Accumulated NOx
reduction measured in tons on the x-axis.
Graph 5.14: Scenario 1: Accumulated total costs measured in 1000 NOK. Accumu-
lated NOx reduction measured in tons on the x-axis.
possible to reach a level of abatement at 26 032 at a total cost of 244 million NOK.
This is 155 million NOK cheaper than what it is reached at today, corresponding
to a 39% reduction of the total costs.27
26There are many rational explanations for this average cost being so high, if this ship only has
been operating in foreign countries there will be no NOx reductions to report to Norway and the
NOx fund.
27399mill - 244million = 155 million
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5.6.2 Scenario 2
In contrast to scenario 1, this scenario looks at what the aggregate marginal abate-
ment cost curve would look like if only SCR, gas and motortechnical rebuilding were
performed and there were twice as many projects as these three categories represent
today. Graph 4.15 suggest that we could reach the same level of abatement as today
Graph 5.15: Scenario 2, measured in NOK/kg NOx reduction. Accumulated NOx
reduction measured in tons on the x-axis.
at a average cost of 15 NOK/kg NOx reduction, compared to todays average cost
of 734 NOK. This corresponds to what SFT found, they assumed that an emission
reduction of around 30 000 tons of NOx could be realized with an average cost of
around 15 NOK/kg NOx reduction. Also, we can compare graph 4.11 to graph 1.2
and we see that scenario 2 draws the same picture as the analysis of SFT. When
looking at the total costs of NOx reduction in scenario 2, we see that we can reach a
NOx reduction of 26 134 tons to a total cost of 321 million NOK. This is 78 million
cheaper than what is spent today, which is 20% cheaper.28 The costs here are higher
because we have not taken into account the projects with a negative average cost,
as we have in the previous section. Therefore, to make the scenarios comparable I
assume that the project with a negative average cost would have been performed
anyways, which correspond to 1 673 tons NOx reduction, according to the assump-
tions made in scenario 1. The total costs would then be 295 million NOK, which is
26% lower than what is spent today. SFT found that 43 000 tons of NOx reduction
28399 million NOK - 321 million NOK = 78 million NOK
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Graph 5.16: Scenario 2: Total costs measured in 1000 NOK. Accumulated NOx
reduction measured in tons on the x-axis.
Graph 5.17: Scenario 2: Accumulated total costs, measured in 1000 NOK. Accu-
mulated NOx reduction measured in tons on the x-axis.
could be reached for total costs 320 million NOK. What I have found is somewhat
higher than what SFT found. This might be because I have used the average costs
from all the projects, which is higher than what SFT predicted.
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6 Adverse Selection
In this chapter I set up a model with asymmetry in information, as this characterizes
the relationship between the NOx-fund and different firms, as the firms have private
information about their own costs. This is because before the new investment
takes place, the firms have private information about how efficient they are. Thus,
we have a principal agent relationship where the NOx-fund is the principal and
the participants of the NOx fund, the firms, are the agents, and we look at the
production of abatement. The precise technology used is private information for
the agent, and this is what we call adverse selection. This could for instance be
private information on specific characteristics about the ship, how big it is and how
many are working on there.
I assume here that the marginal abatement cost is exogenously given, either you
are efficient or an inefficient firm. This is of course a simplifying assumption. One
can do changes on a ship, hire more/less workers etc. to become more efficient, and
this could for instance depend on the firms willingness to exert effort. However,
because these ships are very big in size and also expensive, I ignore the aspect of
effort and hence assume that what makes up for the difference between an efficient
and inefficient firm is given by an exogenously given parameter. For instance a ship
specific parameter unknown to the NOx-fund. Since I ignore the aspect of effort and
only look at an exogenously given efficiency parameter, I choose to use an adverse
selection model and not a moral hazard model.
The NOx fund does not have complete information about the technology of the
firms, and this is the source of the information gap between the principal and the
agent. In order to reach an efficient use of economic resources, the contract between
the two parts must reveal the agents private information. This can be done by giving
up some information rent to the privately informed agent. This information cost
just adds up to the standard technological cost of performing the task and justifies
distortions in the volume of abatement achieved under asymmetric information.
When designing a second-best contract there is a trade off between efficiency and
information rent. In this case we look at a one-shot relationship between the agent
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and the principal. The main result is that the optimal second-best contract calls
for a distortion in the volume of abatement away from the first-best. This model is
based on Laffont and Martimort (2002) ”The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-
Agent Model”.
6.1 The Basic Model
Consider a firm, the NOx fund (the principal), who want to delegate the production
of a units to an agent, where a is production of NOx abatement. The NOx-fund has
received a target for emission reductions of magnitude A from the government. I
assume that the utility function of the fund is linear and increasing up to the value
A, S(a) = α + βa where α = 0. The fund still has an increasing utility above this
level because of positive publicity in media and also get positive credit from the
government to have reached emissions above the target A, so the remaining part of
the curve has the same slope as before. The utility function of the fund is sketched
in figure 6.1, the total value of abatement (the benefit function for the principal),
is a linear and increasing function, and the marginal value is constant and equal to
β.
Figure 6.1: Utility function for the NOx-Fund
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The abatement cost is unobservable to the fund, and we assume that there is
no fixed cost. The fixed cost could for instance be a fixed cost of planning the
abatement project or sending in an application for funding to the NOx-fund, but
as this adds nothing to the analysis we assume that the fixed costs are zero. The
marginal abatement cost θ belongs to the set θ = {θ, θ}. The agent could be either
efficient, θ, and have a low marginal abatement cost, or inefficient, θ, and have a
high marginal abatement cost. It is assumed that the value of the two efficiency
parameters are known to both the firm and the NOx-fund, but the fund is not
capable of attaching the different values of θ to each firm. Relating this model to
the theoretical model in chapter 3, we have now specified the cost function of each
firm. In chapter 3 we only operated with a general cost function, whereas in this
extension we have two possible specifications of the cost function, and which of the
two that belongs to each firm is unknown to the fund. Here the marginal cost of the
agent can take only two possible values, of course it would have been more realistic
to assume a continuum type of marginal abatement cost, but the same type of result
would follow, so therefore I simplify by using only to possible values. We have an
efficient type with probability v = [0, 1] and the inefficient type with probability
(1− v).
Efficient agent:
c(a, θ) = θ
1
2
a2 with probability v (8)
Inefficient agent:
c(a, θ) = θ
1
2
a2 with probability (1− v) (9)
∆θ = θ− θ > 0 is the spread of uncertainty on the agents marginal cost. When
taking the abatement production decision, the agent knows his own type and his
type is exogenously given by assumption. Although we look at the agent as a firm,
I assume that each firm has several projects and we look at one specific project of
a given firm. This could be justified by assuming that we look at the cost function
for the firms represented by two different projects that only differ according to their
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Figure 6.2: Cost function for the firms
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2
efficiency. An example here is rebuilding of the engine at two different ships, where
they differ in how efficient they are at taking the new capital equipment into use.
6.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
6.2.1 First-Best Production of Abatement
First we assume that there is no asymmetry of information between the principal
and the agent. The fund will maximize his utility subject to the two cost functions
with respect to a. The efficient production of abatement is obtained by equating the
principal’s marginal value of abatement and the agents marginal cost of abatement,
where c′a(a, θ) = θa, so that S
′(a) = c′a(a, θ) and S
′(a) = c′a(a, θ).
The first-order conditions for first-best production of abatement is the following:
β = θa (10)
β = θa (11)
a¯ and a should be carried out if their social values are non-negative, W =
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Figure 6.3: Optimal First-Best solution
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S(a)− θ 1
2
a, W¯ = S(a¯)− θ 1
2
a. W > W¯ , the social value of production of abatement
is greater when the agent is efficient, compared to when the agent is inefficient. Since
the principal’s marginal value of abatement is constant, the optimal production of
an efficient agent is greater than that of an inefficient agent, a > a¯.
6.2.2 Implementation of First-Best
The principal must offer the agent a utility level that is at least as high as the
utility level that the agent obtains outside the relationship. These constraints are
called the agent’s participation constraints, and reflects the firms alternative choice
of behavior. We define UT as the utility of the firm if he is not a member of the
NOx-fund and has to pay a tax (17NOK/kg NOx emission) to the government, UM
is the utility of the firm if he is a member of the NOx-fund, but does not apply for
funding for new investments. U I is the utility of the firm if he is a member of the
NOx-fund and gets a subsidy for new investments. I assume that for both firms we
have UT < UM < U I , the utility of the firm is lower when it has to pay a tax than
when he is member of the fund, which is lower than when he is member of the fund
and receives funding. Hence, when considering whether the firm will participate
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Figure 6.4: Optimal First-Best solution. Optimal level of abatement and corre-
sponding optimal subsidy.
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in the relationship we use UM as the outside option. The outside option does not
depend on the type, and I assume in general that we don’t have type dependent
participation constraints.
Starting out with the assumption that the outside option is UM we have the
following participation constraints.
s− θ1
2
a2 ≥ UM (12)
s− θ1
2
a2 ≥ UM (13)
To implement the first-best production of abatement, the principal makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the agents. If θ = θ¯,the principal offers the transfer s¯∗ for
the production level a¯∗, with s¯∗ = UM + θ¯ 1
2
a¯∗, and vise versa for the efficient type.
The optimal First-Best solution is shown in figure 6.4. Both the efficient and the
inefficient firm will make zero extra profit over UM , and accept the offer. These
are the complete information optimal contacts where the efficient firm gets a higher
transfer and produces more abatement than the inefficient firm, because we have
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assumed that UM is equal for both types and a > a¯. They are thus indifferent
between the two choices: being member of the fund and applying for funding and
being member and not apply for funding. None of them receive information rent,
because there is complete information.
6.3 Hidden Information
6.3.1 Incentive Compatibility and Participation
Now we assume that the marginal abatement cost, θ, is the agent’s private informa-
tion. Both the efficient and the inefficient agent will prefer the contract intended
for the least efficient type. The efficient agent will prefer the contract of the inef-
ficient agent because this gives him a profit above UM , as he has lower costs than
the inefficient agent. Thus, offering the two contracts that were optimal under full
information will in this case not make the agent’s reveal their type. The principal
want to make contracts that make the agent’s self select, but this will not be im-
plemented under asymmetric information.29 In order to make the two agents self
select we have the following incentive compatibility constraints:
s− θ1
2
a2 ≥ s− θ 1
2
a2 (14)
s− θ1
2
a2 ≥ s− θ 1
2
a2 (15)
When the two incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied it means that
the agents prefer the contract intended for himself over the contract intended for
the other type, given his efficiency parameter θ. We now have two participation
constraints and two incentive constraints, that together fully characterize the set of
incentive feasible menus of contracts.
29Self select means choosing the contract intended for his own type.
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6.3.2 Optimization Program of the NOx-Fund
The NOx-fund must offer a menu of contracts before knowing which type of the
firm they are facing. Because of this, the fund computes the benefit in expected
terms.
Max v[S(a)− s] + (1− v)[S(a)− s] (16)
subject to
s− θ1
2
a2 ≥ s− θ 1
2
a2 (17)
s− θ1
2
a2 ≥ UM (18)
We use U = s − θ 1
2
a2 and U = s − θ 1
2
a2 to denote the respective information
rent of each type. Under complete information, the NOx-fund, who by assumption
has all bargaining power, is able to maintain the two types at their outside option
utility level UM .
U∗ = s∗ − θ1
2
a∗2 = UM (19)
U∗ = s∗ − θ1
2
a∗2 = UM (20)
Generally, this is not possible anymore, at least not when both the firms produce
a positive amount of abatement. When there is asymmetric information about the
marginal abatement cost for each firm, the utility level that a θ-firm would get by
mimicking a θ-firm is higher than when choosing the contract intended for himself.
This is because the efficient firm benefits from his ability to possibly mimic the less
efficient type.
s− θ1
2
a2 = s− (θ −∆θ)1
2
a2 = s− θ1
2
a2 + ∆θ
1
2
a2 = U + ∆θ
1
2
a2 (21)
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As long as the fund wants both firms to produce abatement, the fund must give up
a positive rent to the most efficient firm, represented by the last term above. This
information rent is generated by the information advantage of the firm over the
fund. The fund’s problem is thus to determine the smartest way to give up the rent
and at the same time make the firm produce the wanted amount of abatement. Now
we are interested in the variables information rent and production of abatement.
We insert for U and U and get:
Max
expected allocative efficiency︷ ︸︸ ︷
v[S(a)− θ1
2
a2] + (1− v)[S(a)− θ1
2
a2]
− [vU + (1− v)U ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected information rent
(22)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints and the two participation con-
straints
U ≥ U + ∆θ1
2
a2 (23)
U ≥ U −∆θ1
2
a2 (24)
U ≥ UM (25)
U ≥ UM (26)
6.4 Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
6.4.1 The Optimal Contract under Asymmetric Information
(23) and (26) are the two binding constraints, and (24) and (26) will also be sat-
isfied.30 We insert these two into the funds maximization problem, which becomes
the following:
Maxv[S(a)− θ1
2
a2] + (1− v)[S(a)− θ1
2
a2]− [v(U + ∆θ1
2
a2 + (1− v)UM ] (27)
30See Laffont and Martimort (2002).
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We differentiate with respect to a and a and assume an interior solution:
v(S ′(a)− θa) = 0 (28)
(1− v)(S ′(a)− θa)− v∆θ1
2
a2 = 0 (29)
Rearranging this gives us two first order conditions, where I denote SB as the second
best solution
S ′(aSB) = θaSB (30)
S ′(aSB) = θa+ v(1−v)∆θ
1
2
a2SB (31)
The first condition shows us that aSB = a
∗, the level of production of abatement
for the efficient firm is the same as in the first best optimum. This is because the
expected rent given does not depend on the level of abatement for the efficient type.
We want to look deeper into the other first order condition.
(1− v)(S ′(aSB)− θaSB) = v∆θ 12a2SB (32)
(1− v)(β − θaSB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected marginal payoff by an increase in a
= v∆θ
1
2
a2SB︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected marginal cost by an increase in a
(33)
This condition expresses the trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction that
exists under asymmetric information. The Fund’s expected payoff in terms of pro-
duction of abatement is the left hand side of this equation. The Fund’s expected
marginal efficiency gain will increase by the left hand side when there is an increase
in the level of abatement for the inefficient firm. At the same time the expected
marginal cost in terms of increased information rent to the efficient firm will also
increase as a increases. These two must balance each other in a second best equilib-
rium. This is the condition that express the important trade-off between efficiency
and rent extraction, which arises under asymmetric information.
Under asymmetric information we have found that the efficient firm will produce
the same amount of abatement as it did under full information and receive a positive
information rent USB = ∆θ 1
2
a2SB, and his total transfer is thus sSB = θ
1
2
a2 +∆θ 1
2
a2SB.
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The inefficient firm will produce a lower level of abatement, aSB < a∗ with S ′(aSB) =
β = θa+ v
(1−v)∆θ
1
2
a2, and receive a second best transfer, sSB = θ
1
2
a2SB.
6.4.2 Graphical Representation of the Second-Best Outcome
This figure shows the second-best outcome, and illustrates exactly how big the
information rent to the efficient type is. The information rent to the efficient firm
is given by the term USB = ∆θ 1
2
a2SB, and represents what the efficient agent must
receive in order not to mimic the inefficient type.
Figure 6.5: Optimal Second-Best solution
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aSB a∗ aSB = a
∗
If the efficient firm pretends to be the inefficient one and chooses his contract he
must produce the level of abatement aSB. For producing this level of abatement he
will receive a subsidy represented by the triangle in figure 6.4, [origo,A,aSB], which
exactly covers the costs of the inefficient firm, as he receives no information rent.
Thus, the surplus for the efficient firm is represented by the triangle, [origo, A, B].
This in turn means that for the efficient firm not to mimic the inefficient firm, the
information rent has to be at least as high as this area.
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6.4.3 Findings in the adverse selection model
The main result in this model is that a first best optimum is impossible to reach
when the firms have information power over the fund, and thus information rent
has to be paid to the most efficient firm. In a second best solution a lower level of
abatement is reached at a higher cost.
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7 Conclusions
This thesis has attempted to evaluate the Norwegian NOx-fund, as an alternative
method to reduce NOx emissions compared to a standard tax system. I start with
a theoretical analysis using a standard tax model and compare it with a fund using
an investment based funding system.
I find that if the tax level is the same in both cases, the fund system will lead to
a higher level of abatement because of the subsidy given to the firms. The subsidy
makes the marginal abatement cost in equilibrium higher, and thus the abatement
level will be greater than in the case of a tax. However, the two taxes are not equal,
and the same optimal solution could be reached in both cases. As we know that
the subsidy given to the firms varies a lot, this suggests that a fund system will
not provide equal marginal abatement costs between firms, and abatement will not
be cost efficiently distributed. One social cost of a fund is that it does not create
public revenue like a tax on emissions would have done. Therefore the fund has two
types of social costs: abatement effects are not cost efficiently allocated between
firms and public revenue is lost and must be collected in other ways.
I analyze the fund by by looking at the marginal abatement cost curve using
data both from implemented and planned abatement projects. Here I find that
the marginal cost of the projects differs a lot between different initiatives, and also
within categories. I find that the most cost efficient initiatives which also contribute
to high abatement levels are fuel saving, SCR and motor technical rebuilding. This
shows that the most efficient initiatives are also among the majority of the funded
projects from the NOx-fund. Changes from existing technology to gas also con-
tribute with high emission reductions, with an average cost somewhat above the
most cost efficient initiatives. I also find that the initiative where the costs varies
the most within that measure is process optimizing, which is a measure that does
not contribute with more than 4% of the total emission reductions.
Finally I present reflections about what would have been the situation under
different circumstances, and I find that it would have been possible to reach the
same level of abatement as what is reached today at a total cost 39% lower than
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today, if twice as many of the projects SCR, motor technical rebuilding and change
to gas were added to the already existing projects. Instead of reaching the level of
26 078 tons of NOx abatement at a total cost of 399 million NOK, it could have
been reached at a total cost of 244 million NOK. In a more modest scenario I find
that the same level of abatement could be reached at a total cost of 321 million
NOK, 20 % cheaper than today, if only these three categories were carried out and
none of the other categories. My estimates of the total costs are also in accordance
with previous studies done by SFT; one scenario finds that they can be reached
at a lower level than what SFT predicted, and the other scenario gives somewhat
higher costs.
One possible explanation for why some average costs are so much higher than
others is that the fund has granted funding to almost all applying projects. As
new investments only are profitable when they are in dock for other maintenance
purposes, this might suggest that one needs more time in order to reach a more
cost efficient solution. If the fund had a longer time perspective, one would have
the possibility to prioritize the most cost efficient investments over others. This
also suggests that if one uses an emission tax, it is necessary to announce the tax a
long time in advance in order for investments to be undertaken when it is profitable
for the firm. Another reason for not reaching the first best level of abatement is
lobbying from interest groups that might affect the government’s preferences when
maximizing welfare. This leads to environmental policy not maximizing the NOx
reduction at the lowest possible costs.
The theoretical analysis is extended by assuming that there is asymmetry in
the information on the firms marginal abatement cost, between the firms and the
NOx-fund. I set up an adverse selection model and find that first best optimum
is impossible to reach because of the information asymmetry. In the second best
solution some information rent must be given up to the most efficient agent in order
to make him not mimic the least efficient firm. The main result here is that the
optimal second best contract gives a lower level of abatement at a higher cost than
the first best solution.
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